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Abstract In this paper we present soundsquatting, a previously unre-
ported type of domain squatting which we uncovered during analysis of
cybersquatting domains. In soundsquatting, an attacker takes advantage
of homophones, i.e., words that sound alike, and registers homophone-
including variants of popular domain names. We explain why sound-
squatting is different from existing domain-squatting attacks, and de-
scribe a tool for the automatic generation of soundsquatting domains.
Using our tool, we discover that attackers are already aware of the princi-
ples of soundsquatting and are monetizing them in various unethical and
illegal ways. In addition, we register our own soundsquatting domains
and study the population of users who reach our monitors, recording a
monthly average of more than 1,700 non-bot page requests. Lastly, we
show how sound-dependent users are particularly vulnerable to sound-
squatting through the abuse of text-to-speech software.
1 Introduction
Due to its critical position, DNS has, over the years, attracted many attacks
targeting various parts of the protocol and the DNS infrastructure. These attacks
can be grouped in the following targeted categories: protocol weaknesses (e.g.,
DNS cache poisoning [14,25]), vulnerable implementations of DNS servers (e.g.,
buffer overflows in BIND [20]), and the interaction of users with DNS. Of all
the aforementioned categories, we postulate that the attacks targeting the user-
DNS interaction are the hardest to eliminate, since they involve the education
of the entire current and future Internet population, rather than the technical
correction of a protocol shortcoming, or a software vulnerability.
One of the ways users interact with DNS is through the typing of domain
names in their browsers’ address bar. Attackers realized early on that users make
spelling mistakes when typing the domain name of their desired destinations
and started registering these “typo-including” domains in order to capitalize on
the potential incoming traffic. This practice was named typosquatting [19,27],
and typosquatters use these domains in a wide range of unethical and illegal
ways including showing paid ads of competitors [21], and the exfiltration of
user credentials through phishing [10]. In addition to typosquatting, other vari-
ations of domain squatting have been proposed over time, such as homograph
attacks [11,16] where the attacker abuses the visual similarity of two characters
from different character sets to construct domains that have the appearance of
a popular authoritative domain but lead to different destinations.
In this paper we present soundsquatting, a domain squatting technique which
we uncovered while researching generic cybersquatting. Soundsquatting takes
advantage of the sound similarity of words and the user’s confusion of which
word represents the desired concept. The attack is based on homophones, i.e.,
sets of words that are pronounced the same but are spelled differently, e.g., {ate,
eight}. Soundsquatting is different from typosquatting in that it does not rely
on typing mistakes and in that not all domains contain homophones and thus,
not all domains can be soundsquatted.
To evaluate soundsquatting, we compile an English homophone database
and we design AutoSS (AutoSoundSquatter), a tool which, given a list of target
domains, generates valid soundsquatting domains. For the Alexa top 10,000 web-
sites, AutoSS was able to generate 8,476 soundsquatting domains, 1,823 (21.5%)
of which were already registered. Through a series of automatic and manual ex-
periments, we categorize these registered domains and discover that, even though
homophone-based domain squatting has not appeared in literature around cy-
bersquatting, its principles are known and practiced by cybersquatters, albeit to
a lesser extent than typosquatting. Using data that we obtain through crawling,
we show that soundsquatting is being used for displaying ads on parked do-
mains, stealing traffic from target domains, performing affiliate scams, conduct-
ing phishing attacks and installing malicious software on unsuspecting visitors.
In addition to studying the use of already registered soundsquatting domains,
we register 30 available ones and study the population of users that reached
our domains, recording a monthly average of 1,718 requests from real users,
originating from 123 countries, showing that users are indeed susceptible to
homophone confusion. Finally, we examine six popular software screen readers
and show how they can all be abused to perform soundsquatting attacks against
sound-dependent users who rely on text-to-speech software.
Overall, our findings show that soundsquatting can be abused in exactly the
same way as typosquatting, and thus should be taken into account by owners of
large websites when they are trying to protect their brand-names and customers.
Our main contributions are:
– We uncover a, previously unreported, domain-squatting attack, based on
homophone-confusion rather than typographic mistakes, which we name
soundsquatting, and present the architecture of a tool capable of automati-
cally generating soundsquatting domains.
– We perform a systematic, large-scale analysis of the existing soundsquatting
domains targeting the Alexa top 10,000 sites and highlight their abuse.
– We actively measure the worldwide population of users who make homo-
phone mistakes, confirming the validity and practicality of the attack.
– We show how soundsquatting can be used against sound-dependent users.
2 Soundsquatting
In this section, we introduce all the necessary terminology for soundsquatting and
describe in detail the workings of AutoSS, our tool for the automatic generation
of soundsquatting domains. Lastly, we examine the soundsquatting domains that
our tool generated, when targeting the Alexa top 10,000 sites.
2.1 Terminology
Homophones are sets of words that have the same pronunciation. Homophones
can be spelled differently but have the same meaning, such as {guarantee, guar-
anty} or spelled differently and have a different meaning, such as {whether,
weather} and {idle, idol, idyll}.
Given the aforementioned definition of homophones, we define soundsquat-
ting as the practice of registering domain names that contain words that are
homophones of authoritative domains and soundsquatters the individuals or or-
ganizations involved in the activity of soundsquatting. As in generic domain
squatting, authoritative domains are domains that are targeted by soundsquat-
ters, and usually belong to high-traffic websites with millions of visitors. The
more legitimate users a website has, the more users are likely to land on the web-
site connected to the soundsquatting domain. When an authoritative domain is
targeted by a soundsquatting attack, this domain is called soundsquatted.
For instance, assuming weatherportal.com, an authoritative weather site, a
soundsquatter can register the domain whetherportal.com, in order to capture
the traffic of users who mistakenly type the word “whether” instead of “weather”.
When users type the wrong word and reach the soundsquatting domain, the
soundsquatter, like generic domain squatters, can then monetize their visit in a
wide range of unethical and illegal ways.
2.2 Differences with Typosquatting
Before moving on to the discovery and study of soundsquatting domains, it
is important to differentiate soundsquatting from typosquatting. As the term re-
veals, typosquatting involves “typos”, i.e., misspellings of domain names, usually
associated with typing mistakes. In 2006, Wang et al. categorized the typos in-
volved in typosquatting in five different categories [27]. Assuming the domain
example.com and the intended URL www.example.com, the five proposed cate-
gories are the following:
1. Missing-dot typos: The dot following “www” is forgotten, e.g., wwwexample.
com
2. Character-omission typos: One character is omitted, e.g., www.exmple.
com
3. Character-permutation typos: Consecutive characters are swapped, e.g.,
www.examlpe.com
4. Character-replacement typos: Characters are replaced by their adjacent
ones, given a specific keyboard layout, e.g., www.ezample.com where “x” was
replaced by the QWERTY-adjacent “z”.
5. Character-insertion typos: Characters are mistakenly typed twice, e.g.,
www.exaample.com
Later research in typosquatting showed that in addition to the above classes
of typos, domain squatters are also registering authoritative domains under dif-
ferent, less-popular top-level domains [4].
In all of the above cases, users intend to type a specific URL, but acciden-
tally mistype the URL and initiate a request for the wrong page, before real-
izing their mistake. Contrastingly, in soundsquatting, users type exactly what
they were planning to, but their intended destination is a different one. The
mistake happens at a word-level, rather than a character-level, and the substi-
tuted words are real dictionary words and not mistypes of other words. The
confusion between the intended word and the typed one, is further amplified
when a domain contains a homophone belonging to a set of homophones with
the same meaning. Consider guarantybanking.com, a domain belonging to a
banking website. As mentioned earlier, “guarantee” is a homophone of “guar-
anty”, and guaranteebanking.com is, at the time of this writing, parked and
available for sale. In such cases, the typing of the “correct” domain, involves the
memorization of one specific spelling, rather than a translation from concepts
into words. It is also difficult to predict, if a person hears about “Guarantee
Banking” for the first time, which spelling will she choose to use.
2.3 Generating soundsquatting domains
Any system that is geared towards the discovery of domain-squatting activity re-
quires at least the following two resources: a set of target, authoritative domains
and a list of rules and models for the transformation of authoritative domains
and the generation of possible squatting domains. In the case of typosquatting,
these rules may be the neighboring characters of every key under a specific key-
board layout and models of character omission, duplication and replacement.
For soundsquatting, these resources are the following:
Authoritative domain list: Under the assumption that popular domains
are targeted more than less popular domains, we obtained a list of the top 10,000
Internet websites, according to Alexa. In Section 2.4 we provide the number of
unique domains contained in this list.
Dictionary: A dictionary (or wordlist) is required for the extraction of valid
words from domain names. For instance, given a sufficiently large dictionary
and the domain youtube.com, an algorithm can straightforwardly search for
Figure 1. The architecture of AutoSS. Given a homophone database, a list of
target domains and a dictionary, AutoSS outputs a list of possible soundsquat-
ting domains
the presence of all words in that domain (excluding the top-level domain) and
conclude that the domain is comprised out of the words “you” and “tube”.
Transformation rules: Apart from a dictionary, a database of English ho-
mophones is also required. We compiled a homophone database, by scraping
homophone.com, a website dedicated to homophones, and Wikipedia’s list of
dialect-independent homophones [28]. In addition, we manually added to our
homophone database the list of numbers from one to one hundred together with
their appropriate word form, e.g., {9, nine}, and a few common idioms used
regularly in Internet slang, e.g., {you, u}.
To automatically generate soundsquatting domains, we created AutoSS (Au-
toSoundSquatter), a tool which receives as input the aforementioned resources
and generates valid soundsquatting domains – see Figure 1. AutoSS operates as
follows. After the loading to memory of the homophone database and the dic-
tionary, each entry in the Alexa list of websites is parsed, in order to isolate the
main domain, from its domain extension and possible subdomains and paths.
If the resulting string contains dashes (-), then we perceive this as a sign, from
the domain owner, of separation of words; e.g., search-results.com can be
separated to the words “search” and “results” without the aid of a dictionary.
If the domain does not contain dashes, then we perform a string search for the
presence of every word in our dictionary, in the domain. While this is a relatively
fast process, the resulting set of candidate words (CW in Figure 1) requires sub-
stantial processing, mainly due to candidate words included in other candidate
words and the presence of accidental words. Below, we describe these issues and
our techniques for automatically detecting and resolving them:
Words-in-Words Removal: Consider the domain linkedin.com and the ho-
mophone set {in, inn}. Even though we would, ideally, want to discover just
the words “linked” and “in”, a typical dictionary search will discover the words:
{in, ink, inked, ked, link, linked}. The obvious next step would be to delete all
candidate words words that are contained in others. The issue, however, is that,
while the words {in, ink, inked, ked, link} are all contained in the word “linked”,
a removal of the word “in” from the candidate words is wrong (since the word
exists on its own accord after the word “linked”) and by doing so we miss the
opportunity of generating the soundsquatting domain linkedinn.com. In our
implementation we solve this problem as follows:
Whenever a pair of words {a, b} is found, where a is included in b, b is
replaced, in the domain name, by another string of equal length. After this
replacement, the domain name is searched again for the presence of word a. If
the word is still found, then a is not deleted from the set of candidate words.
Thus, in our earlier example and the pair of words {in, linked}, linkedin.com
is transformed to in.com. Since the word “in” is still found in the domain
name, it is not removed from the candidate words. Before proceeding, our tool
also records the index of the word’s location in the transformed domain in the
“Word Index” component, so that when, at a later step, words are replaced by
their homophones, our tool replaces the appropriate “in”, avoiding results such
as linnkedinn.com, which do not conform to our definition of soundsquatting
since “linnked” is neither a valid dictionary word, nor a homophone of any other
word. At the end of this process, our candidate words set is reduced to {linked,
in} (CW′ in Figure 1), which is the desirable outcome.
Accidental Words Removal: This module receives the, possibly modified,
candidate-words set from the Words-in-Words module and attempts to identify
and remove accidental words from the candidate words. The issue of accidental
words can be illustrated as follows. Consider the domain leaseweb.com, belong-
ing to a web-hosting provider. The ideal word breakdown would be {lease, web}.
Given our dictionary and the previous step of selective removal of words that
are included in others, AutoSS would discover the words {lease, sew, web}. In
this set, the word “sew” is included since it is a dictionary word, which acciden-
tally appears in the domain name, formed by the last two letters of the word
“lease” and the first letter of the word “web”. We partially solve this problem







until either the permutation perfectly matches the target domain name (CW′′),
or, due to the exponential nature of permutations, the computation reaches a
timeout. If the timeout is reached before the module finishes, then AutoSS falls
back to the candidate word list that was received by the WiW Removal.
Homophone Replacement: In this last module, AutoSS uses the set of can-
didate words discovered by the previous modules and generates new domains,
through the replacement of one homophone word by another. To this end, the
module queries its homophones database for each candidate word, and for each
homophone discovered the system generates a new soundsquatting domain, by
replacing the candidate word with a homophone. For every candidate word, the
module takes into account information found in the Word Index, so as to replace
the right word in the aforementioned corner cases.
In addition to single replacements of homophones, AutoSS has a “Level” pa-
rameter (as shown in Figure 1), which specifies the number of concurrent homo-
phone replacements for domain names with more than one homophones discov-
ered. Consider the case of thepiratebay.se, a popular Torrent tracker. AutoSS
will discover the homophones {the, thee} and {bay, bey}. While these can be used
to create the soundsquatting domains theepiratebay.se and thepiratebey.se,
a third domain can be generated by replacing both at the same time, i.e.,
theepiratebey.se. For our experiments we chose a Level of two, in order to limit
AutoSS to maximum two homophone replacements at a time, even if a domain
contains multiple homophones. While a higher Level would allow significantly
more combinations and thus generate many more soundsquatting domains, we
reasoned that three or more homophone mistakes in a single domain name are
unlikely to occur, and thus decided against it.
AutoSS Limitations: Due to the flexibility of the English language and the
freedom of infinite word-plays, our system’s techniques for isolating words in
domain names are necessarily heuristic-based. In Section 6, we estimate the
amount of false positives generated by AutoSS, and briefly discuss possible ways
of further lowering false positives that could be pursued in future work.
2.4 Results
From the Alexa list of top 10,000 Internet websites, we extracted 9,926 Public
Suffix + 1 domains. Given these domains and our homophone database which
contains 2,913 words belonging to 1,337 sets of homophones, AutoSS extracted
a total of 6,418 homophones from the list of domains which, when combined up
to a level of two, generated 8,476 soundsquatting domains. Interestingly, in our
results we saw that 67.3% of the domains contained no homophones.
The highest ranking domain which contained homophones was youtube.
com, for which AutoSS generated the domains: yewtube.com, ewetube.com and
utube.com. The domain with the most homophones was wearehairy.com, with a
ranking of 5,663 in the Alexa list of websites, containing 12 different homophones
which, when combined, allowed for 32 different soundsquatting domains. From
the 1,337 sets of homophones, 568 (42.48%) were used at least once to generate
a soundsquatting domain. Table 1 shows the ten homophone sets used the most
by AutoSS over the Alexa list of websites.
In Figure 2, we explore the correlation between the ranking of a website and
the number of homophones found in its domain name. The scatterplot reveals
that there is no significant relationship between the two, meaning that, on av-
erage, high ranking websites are as vulnerable to soundsquatting as low-ranking
ones. This is an experimental validation of what we intuitively expected: homo-
phones are dependent on the choice of words, which is unrelated to the popularity




{2, two, to, too} 735
{1, one, won} 300
{ere, air, aire, are, ayr,
278
ayre, err, eyre, heir}
{four, 4, for, fore} 250
{bi, buy, by, bye} 223
{do, dew, due, doe, dough} 208
{whirled, whorled, world} 156
{yew, you, ewe, u} 150
{cite, sight, site} 134
{0, zero, -xero} 134
Table 1. Top ten homophone
sets for word replacements in
the Alexa top 10K sites
Figure 2. Scatterplot showing the lack
of a significant correlation between a
website’s popularity and the number
of homophones contained in its domain
name (r=0.019)
3 Evaluation of Soundsquatting
In this section, through a series of automated and manual experiments, we ana-
lyze the existing, i.e., already registered, soundsquatting domains and categorize
them according to the purpose that they serve.
3.1 Method of Categorization
In Section 2.3 we described AutoSS, our system for the automatic generation
of soundsquatting domains, and we showed that it was able to generate 8,476
soundsquatting domains targeting the Alexa top 10,000 sites. In order to find out
whether domain squatters are already aware of homophones and the principles
of soundsquatting, we performed a two-step process to identify the domains
that were already registered. First, we tried to resolve all domains to their IP
addresses. A domain that successfully resolves is obviously registered, however a
domain that does not resolve may still be registered but not assigned a valid IP
address. Thus, for the set of domains that did not resolve to an IP address, we
performed WHOIS lookups, and tried to register them with a popular domain
name registrar. At the end of this process, we identified that 1,823 domains
(21.5% of the total domains generated) were already registered.
In order to classify the registered domains, we implemented a crawler based
on PhantomJS [15] that visited each of the 1,823 domains, waited for ten seconds
(to allow the loading of remote content) and then took a screenshot of the page
as well as recorded the HTML and final URL for later processing. The final URL
was used in order to detect redirections from the visited soundsquatting domain
to a different domain. To categorize each site, we followed a semi-automatic ap-
proach. We begun by manually skimming over the screenshots of all pages and
grouping together images that looked alike. The majority of these were parked
pages, i.e., pages that show ads, somewhat relevant to the domain name and usu-
ally also advertise that the domain may be for sale. Other groups were pages with
little content, stating that the site is “under construction”, placeholder pages by
popular registrars informing their clients how to setup a website on their reg-
istered domain, and pages containing generic errors, such as 404 Forbidden.
For each group, we examined the corresponding HTML of a few domains and
created generic HTML- and JavaScript-signatures that could automatically cat-
egorize the remaining pages within each group. Using this approach, our page-
characterizing scripts could eventually automatically classify 77.2% of all the
crawled domains. The remaining unclassified domains (417) were classified man-
ually by visiting each website and carefully inspecting the source code, available
WHOIS information and any similarities (visual-, content- and audience-based)
between the soundsquatting domain and the corresponding authoritative one.
3.2 Categorization results
By combining the results of the automatic classification and those of our manual
investigation, we categorized the registered soundsquatting domains as follows:
Authoritative-owned domains: From the 1,823 studied domains, we iden-
tified 155 soundsquatting domains which belonged to the companies and orga-
nizations behind the corresponding authoritative domains. In the vast majority
of cases, the user would be automatically redirected to the correct authoritative
domain without warnings or additional dialogues. The redirect almost always
happened through a 301/302 HTTP status code and occasionally users were
redirected to one or two intermediate hosts, which would in-turn redirect them
to the appropriate domain. In these cases, we were able to identify that the in-
termediate hosts belong to brand-protecting companies which were, most likely,
registering the fact that a user did a specific mistake, before redirecting her to
the appropriate destination.
In two instances, the owners of the authoritative domains were attempting to
educate their users about homophone confusion. For instance, myfreepaysight.
com is a soundsquatting domain for the adult site myfreepaysite.com. When
the soundsquatting domain is visited, users greeted with a message that points
out the difference between the two domains.
Parked/Ads/For Sale domains: Parked domains have been identified by
prior research as the preferred monetizing way of domain squatters [21,27]. As
we mentioned earlier, these domains contain no real content, except ads which
are constructed on demand, usually by a domain-parking agency, based on the
words included in a domain name and preferences by the owner of the domain.
In this category, we also include domains that were found to show ads without
being affiliated with a large domain-parking agency, e.g., net0.net, a sound-
squatting domain targeting netzero.net, as well as domains that are listed as
“for-sale”. In total, ad-driven domains represent the largest chunk of existing
soundsquatting domains, with 954 cases (52.3%).
Affiliate-abusing domains: While examining the soundsquatting domains
that redirected the user to the appropriate authoritative domain, we realized that
32 soundsquatting domains were abusing affiliate programs of the corresponding
authoritative domains. In affiliate programs, existing customers of a website are
encouraged to bring new customers, through the promise of a small commission
for every brought customer.
In affiliate abuse, an attacker takes advantage of an affiliate program of
a website by appending his own affiliate identifier to unsuspecting visitors.
More specifically, consider the domain mybrowsercache.com which is a sound-
squatting domain for mybrowsercash.com. At the time of this writing, when a
user visits the former domain, she will automatically be redirected to http:
//www.mybrowsercash.com/index.php?refid=312044. Notice that a specific
referrer identifier is added to the URL. In this way, the attacker who registered
mybrowsercache.com will gain a commission every time that a user confuses
“cash” and “cache”, and subsequently registers to the target website. In addi-
tion to soundsquatting domains redirecting to sites with affiliate programs, we
also recorded some cases where the user was kept on the soundsquatting domain
and the authoritative site, together with the attacker’s affiliate identifier, was
opened in a full-page HTML frame.
Hit-stealing domains: From our analysis, we discovered 22 cases where
attackers used soundsquatting to capture traffic and feed their own “business-
related” domains with hits intended for the authoritative targeted site. In fact, in
the majority of cases, both the soundsquatting and corresponding authoritative
domain had content belonging to the same category, but they were owned by
different organizations and individuals. From our experiments, we found that the
most targeted business categories are adult, online shopping and travel. Below,
is a list of a few examples:
– ashemailtube.com is a soundsquatting domain for the domain ashemaletube.
com, a transvestite-oriented porn site. When the soundsquatting domain is
visited, the user is redirected to trannydates.com a dating site specifically
for transvestites.
– video-1.com, a soundsquatting domain for the adult video portal video-one.
com, currently hosts an online sex shop
– todomains.ru is selling domain-registration services and is a soundsquatting
domain for 2domains.ru, a large Russian domain registrar.
– gamefive.com is a soundsquatting domain for game5.com, an online gaming
site. The soundsquatting domain had been for sale for three years before
being turned into an online gaming site.
– textsail.ru is a soundsquatting site for textsale.ru. Both sites sell arti-
cles and stories on a wide range of topics.
In this category, we also included soundsquatting domains that profit from
the trustworthiness associated with well-known and popular authoritative do-
mains, in order to advertise non-related websites. In these cases, it is not nec-
essary that the category of the soundsquatting domain matches the category of
the targeted authoritative domain. For example, the owner of freemale.hu is
probably exploiting the popularity of the well-known Hungarian e-mail provider
freemail.hu to advertise his own web page, in the same way that the sound-
squatting domain tvto.no is abusing the popularity of the Norwegian TV2 chan-
nel tv2.no and subsequently redirects the user to an online casino.
Scam-related domains: Soundsquatting domains can also be used for
scamming purposes. We identified 16 cases of domains used to perform different
form of scams, generally by luring visitors into subscribing to fake lotteries and
surveys. For instance, vhone.com, a soundsquatting domain targeting vh1.com,
redirects the user to a survey site, where users are promised an opportunity to
win high-end electronics in return to their participation in a short survey. The
users are then trapped in a series of redirects where they are constantly promised
more and more prizes while they divulge more and more private information,
such as their names, email addresses and mobile phone numbers.
Promoting-related domains: In this category, we included seven domains
that were used to promote someone or something related to the authorita-
tive domain. For example, teambeechbody.com is a soundsquatting domain
for teambeachbody.com, an online fitness club where people can subscribe as
“fitness coaches” and gain a commission for every user that they successfully
coach. At the time of this writing, when the soundsquatting domain is visited,
the user is redirected to the page of a specific coach within the authoritative
teambeachbody.com domain, giving that specific coach higher chances of getting
selected to coach a user, over other coaches on the website. In another case, the
authoritative readnovel.com domain is soundsquatted by rednovel.com, which
redirects the user to http://www.lvse.com/site/readnovel-com-3550.html.
The page contains a review of the authoritative website, providing a safety score,
user comments and similar websites.
Others domains: We conclude our analysis with six soundsquatting do-
mains used for malicious purposes, e.g., to install malware and acquire private
information. Movreel (movreel.com), is a free-of-charge service for streaming
movies, and movreal.com is one of its soundsquatting domains. At a first glance,
movreal.com appears to be another streaming provider for movies, but interest-
ingly the user is requested to download a browser plug-in (AVS Media Player.exe)
to watch the video. The offered plug-in, however, is malicious and detected by
most antivirus vendors as a variant of the solimba malware, i.e., an installer
for other malicious software and a provider of adware campaigns. Similarly,
utube.com, a soundsquatting domain for youtube.com, makes use of videos to
social-engineer the user into first divulging her personal information and then,
depending on the type of browser used, installing a browser extension. The ex-
tension installed when using Mozilla Firefox, injects unwanted search results,
launches pop-ups, and gathers user statistics.
Among the other cases, we identified two domains that are likely used to
acquire private user information, in particular email credentials. One of these
is innbox.lv, which is the soundsquatting domain of the well-known Latvian
service provider InBox, where both sites offer free e-mail accounts. Finally, we
were able to confirm two soundsquatting domains involved in phishing campaigns
against e-commerce and business-related sites.
Summary: Overall, by combining the results of the outlined categories, out of
the 1,823 registered soundsquatting domains, 1,037 (56.88%) were categorized
as malicious. For the remaining domains, 155 of them belong to the correspond-
ing authoritative domains’ owners, 300 domains are registered under different
organizations that are using them in a legitimate way, and 331 domains were
offline, or showing HTTP errors, or under construction when we visited them.
4 User Characterization
In previous sections, we categorized the registered soundsquatting domains ac-
cording to their use. We now turn our attention to the users who, due to homo-
phone confusion, land on soundsquatting domains and study their population.
As described in Section 2.4, AutoSS was able to generate 8,476 soundsquat-
ting domains for the Alexa top 10,000 websites. From these, 1,823 domains
(21.5%) were already registered, leaving 6,653 unregistered soundsquatting do-
mains. To actively measure the worldwide population of users, and to assess the
viability of the soundsquatting attack, we decided to register our own sound-
squatting domains and monitor the requests towards them. Since there is no
prior research on soundsquatting, there was no objective or historical way of
assessing which of the unregistered domains would attract more users than oth-
ers. For this reason, we manually examined the list of available soundsquatting
domains from which we selected a total of 30 domains, trying to cover a wide
range of soundsquatting errors.
The first three columns of Table 2 show 20 of the 30 authoritative domains
targeted, the pair(s) of used homophones and the registered soundsquatting
domains.While three of targeted domains could be associated with typosquat-
ting, e.g., theefreedictionary.com, the rest are radically different from do-
mains which researchers have, over the years, associated with typosquatting,
e.g., prophetclicking.com. Most domains were registered in December 2012
while some additional ones were registered in March 2013. To present a uniform
view of traffic, we provide the monthly average number of requests that each
domain received, till December 11, 2013.
We resolved all domains, subdomains and requests for specific file paths to a
single blank page, while recording each request’s details in a set of Apache log
files. Users were not automatically redirected to the appropriate authoritative
domain, to avoid reinforcing the behavior of typing the wrong domain, but rather
to make users aware of their mistake. We discuss our ethical considerations
regarding this experiment, in the Appendix of this paper.
The last column of Table 2 shows the monthly average number of human
requests received during the monitored period, and the percentage of human
requests over all requests. To assess the impact of soundsquatting on humans,
we needed to separate visiting bots from visiting human users. To the best of our
Auth. Domain Homophone pair SS Domain
#Human Req.
(per month)
thefreedictionary.com {the,thee} theefreedictionary.com 283 (39.86%)
fc2.com {2, too} fctoo.com 165 (44.84%)
jimdo.com {do, doe} jimdoe.com 150 (38.27%)
turbobit.net {bit, bitt} turbobitt.net 132 (36.07%)
leboncoin.fr {coin, quoin} lebonquoin.fr 110 (74.32%)
adserverplus.com {ad, add} addserverplus.com 98 (60.49%)
profitclicking.com {profit, prophet} prophetclicking.com 56 (48.28%)
hostgator.com {gator, gaiter} hostgaiter.com 45 (45.92%)
sitesell.com {sell, cel} sitecel.com 44 (40.00%)
discuz.net {disc, disk} diskuz.net 43 (40.19%)
tube8.com {8, ait} tubeait.com 42 (43.30%)
clixsense.com {sense, scents} clixscents.com 40 (44.44%)
a8.net {8, eight} aeight.net 48 (43.24%)
newegg.com {new, gnu} gnuegg.com 37 (36.63%)
redtubelive.com {red, read} readtubelive.com 44 (51.76%)
fiverr.com {err, air} fivair.com 33 (37.93%)
exoclick.com {click, clique} exoclique.com 32 (45.71%)
theglobeandmail.com {mail, male} theglobeandmale.com 35 (38.46%)
pastebin.com {bin, been} pastebeen.com 35 (39.77%)
ku6.com {6, sics} kusics.com 28 (33.33%)
... ... ... ...
Total Requests per Month (30 domains): 1,718
Table 2. A list of 20 out of the 30 registered soundsquatting domains, the
corresponding authoritative domains, the homophone pair used, the monthly
average number of human requests received, as well as the percentage human
traffic against total traffic.
knowledge, there is no single, generic technique that can perfectly separate bots
from humans. If such a technique would exist, attackers would use it to perfectly
evade malware researchers, by detecting all high-interaction honeypots and never
presenting them with malicious code.
For our purposes, we separated the requests as follows: during preliminary
manual inspection of the recorded requests, we noted which requests had non-
standard user-agents. Using keywords extracted from these requests, we assem-
bled a set of nine generic identifiers, like “spider”, “bot” and “crawl”, that many
bots have in common. In addition to these generic identifiers, we scraped 707 spe-
cific bot signatures from useragentstring.com. As a result, if the user agent
contained any of the 716 bot signatures in our set, the request was classified
as belonging to a bot. To account for bots which do not identify themselves,
we also queried the IP address of each request, in the blacklist provided by
stopforumspam.com, i.e., a database containing hundreds of thousands of IP
addresses, belonging to known forum spamming bots. Lastly, each address was
queried in a list of IP addresses used by well-known search engine spiders [1].
Table 2 shows that our set of 30 soundsquatting domains received an av-
erage of 1,718 human requests per month. The monthly average of total re-
quests (not shown in the table) was 4,150. The domain that received the most
hits, theefreedictionary.com, is a domain that can also be associated with
typosquatting and thus naturally attracts more traffic than domains that are
just soundsquatting. Apart from requests towards the main page of each web-
site, we recorded many requests towards subdomains within each domain. For
instance, jimdo.com is a web application where users can create their own web-
sites and host them on subdomains of the main domain. In our jimdoe.com
logs, we found requests towards 176 subdomains connected to personal sites,
such as awesomegrizzlybears.jimdoe.com, karatedojo-oppeln.jimdoe.com
and armaniwoe.jimdoe.com. These were all valid subdomains within the main
jimdo.com domain and thus their visits show that, even though people can
accurately type relatively long and obscure subdomains, they can still confuse
homophone words.
By geolocating the IP addresses of all requests we discovered that, while
there were 42 countries involved in the crawling of our domains, requests from
human visitors originated from 123 different countries, demonstrating that users
from all countries are prone to homophone confusion and thus vulnerable to
soundsquatting attacks.
In general, each soundsquatting domain received between 2 and 283 human
requests per month. While these numbers are not incredibly large, and probably
smaller than popular typosquatting domains, it is important to remind the reader
that soundsquatting and typosquatting are not competing techniques, but rather
complementing ones in the arsenal of domain squatters. Moreover, since we are
the first ones to study soundsquatting, we registered domains with homophone
replacements ranging from more likely, to less likely. Careful attackers could
target domains in a better way, and thus acquire more users for a smaller cost.
Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that we received a significant number
of emails sent to our soundsquatting domains. Among others, we received so-
cial networking invitations, notifications of the shipment of various products,
account-creation emails with credentials, and bills of mobile telephony. In all
cases, it was evident that the emails were meant to be sent to accounts be-
longing to the legitimate domains which we targeted, but were sent to us due
to homophone confusion. The receipt of these emails further demonstrates that
businesses and users are indeed vulnerable to soundsquatting attacks.
5 Sound-dependent users
In previous sections, we described the soundsquatting attack and we investigated
the existing soundsquatting domains as well as the users’ susceptibility to ho-
mophone confusion. In this section, we describe a variation of the attack that is
geared towards people that rely on sound.
According to the Word Health Organization, there are currently 285 million
people that are visually impaired, of which 39 million are blind [2]. People that
are severely visually impaired, cannot properly interact with a computer without
the use of assistive technologies. The two most popular assistive technologies for
the visually impaired are Braille displays and screen readers [9]. In both cases,
the assistive technology converts content that would be consumed by sight, into
content that can be consumed by touch or sound. If one thinks of the definition
of homophones and their relation to soundsquatting, a new attack becomes clear.
A user that depends on a screen reader in order to consume content in emails,
web pages, messages in social networks or instant messaging applications, is vul-
nerable to links pointing to soundsquatting domains. A soundsquatting domain
will be “read” near-identical with the targeted authoritative domain and thus
the visually impaired user has no reason not to click on the offered link. While
Braille displays are not vulnerable to this attack, the fact that about 90% of
the visually impaired people live in developing countries combined with the high
cost of Braille displays, suggest that, due to limited resources and possible porta-
bility issues, screen readers are used much more than Braille devices. Moreover,
apart from visually-impaired users, hundreds of thousands of smartphone users
utilize personal assistant software, like Apple’s Siri, with text-to-speech capa-
bilities when involved in another activity that makes it hard to operate their
smartphones, like driving or running.
To test our theory, we sent to a web-mail account an email with two links,
one pointing to youtube.com and one pointing to yewtube.com. We had our
email read to us by five popular free screen readers, i.e., by the built-in screen
reader of Windows XP, Windows 7 and Mac OS X, the Linux-based, open-source
ORCA [23], and the Thunder screen reader [26]. We also sent a text-message
with the same information to an Android smartphone with Skyvi [5], a popular
Siri-like application installed by more than 260,000 users.
In all six cases, the two links sounded identical to each other which means
that a sound-dependent person would have no means of separating a legitimate
link from a malicious one. To further exacerbate the issue, this type of attack can
also work with pseudohomophones, i.e., combinations of characters that are not
real dictionary words but are purposefully constructed to sound like real words,
such as {joke, joak} [24]. Thus, pseudo-soundsquatting domains can be crafted
even for target domains that contain no homophones, such as phacebook.com
and phaceboocc.com.
Due to the potentially large number of such domain variations and the speci-
ficity of this attack, we reason that the responsibility of protecting a sound-
dependent user should be on the text-to-speech software.One way of protecting
against this threat is for the software to switch to a “spelling mode” whenever
a link is encountered, so that the user will realize that the link is not what it
sounds like and avoid visiting the malicious website.
6 Limitations & Future work
In Section 2.3 we described the workings of AutoSS, a tool that automatically
generates soundsquatting domains. While we accounted for many corner cases
when attempting to identify the words comprising a domain name, there is, un-
fortunately, still room for false positives, i.e., generated domains that do not
conform to our definition of soundsquatting and the intuition behind it. For in-
stance, there are many domains in the Alexa top 10,000 which do not include
English words, like laredoute.fr, a French e-shop. AutoSS uses an English
dictionary and thus will identify the words “lare”, “do” and “ute” inside the
domain name. The “Accidental Words Removal” module of AutoSS, will suc-
cessfully combine these words to “laredoute” and thus, the words will then be
used as keys in our homophone replacement database resulting to improbable
domains, such as laredewute.fr. Prior systems proposed to automatically gen-
erate typosquatting domains do not suffer from such problems, since they operate
at a character level [21,27] whereas soundsquatting operates at a word level.
To estimate the number of false positives, we randomly sampled 5% (424)
of the generated soundsquatting domains and manually examined each homo-
phone replacement, classifying each domain as a true or false positive. At the
end of this process we identified 80 false positives out of the 424 investigated
domains (18.9% with a margin of sampling error ±4.75%). While the number
of false positives is not negligible, the main purpose of our work was to inves-
tigate a previously unreported domain-squatting technique and to evaluate its
practicality and adoption on the web which we believe that we did.
The lack of punctuation in a domain name makes identifying its language, a
challenging task. One way around this problem would be to actually inspect the
main page of the site, characterize the language of that, and assume that the
domain name contains words of the same language. We leave the exploration of
this and other techniques of reducing false positives, for future work.
7 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one that uncovers the use
of homophones as a way of performing domain squatting, and systematically
studies the adoption of the attack, as well as the user’s susceptibility towards it.
Domain squatting was the first type of cybersquatting involving the registra-
tion of domains that were trademarks belonging to other persons and companies,
before the latter had a chance to register [6,8,13]. Domain squatting later evolved
into typosquatting [8,21,27], i.e., the act of registering domains that are mistypes
of popular authoritative domains which can be traced back to 1999, through the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) which already mentions
URLs that are “sufficiently similar to a trademark of a person or entity.”[3]
Apart from typosquatting, there also exist other, less popular, types of do-
main squatting, such as domains that abuse the visual similarity of characters in
different character sets [11,16], and domains that capture the traffic originating
from erroneous bit-flips in user devices [7,22].
8 Conclusion
In this paper we uncovered a new type of domain squatting based on the sound
similarity of words, rather than typographical mistakes. We named the attack
“soundsquatting”, described a system for automatically generating soundsquat-
ting domains, and showed that attackers are already familiar with the concepts
behind soundsquatting, abusing them in ways similar to known types of domain
squatting. By registering our own soundsquatting domains, we showed that it is
possible for well-selected soundsquatting domains to attract hundreds of human
visitors every month. We also briefly examined the relationship between text-
to-speech software and soundsquatting, and showed that attackers could abuse
the former to trick sound-dependent users into visiting malicious soundsquatting
and pseudo-soundsquatting domains. Overall, our findings verify the practicality
of soundsquatting and show that homophone confusion should be accounted for,
by website owners, registrars, and cybersquatting countermeasures.
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A Appendix
Ethical considerations Registering soundsquatting domains and receiving
user traffic to these domains may raise ethical concerns. However, analogous
to the real-world experiments conducted by Jakobsson et al. [17,18], we believe
that realistic experiments are the only way to reliably estimate success rates
of attacks in the real world. Moreover, we believe that our findings will help
websites to protect their brands and customers.
The data that was collected for this experiment are the following: For each
request to our soundsquatting domains we recorded i) its timestamp ii) the IP
address of the host performing the request, iii) domain, path and GET parame-
ters and iv) the user agent, as provided by the Apache web server. This kind of
data is collected by every web server on the web in standard server logs and many
web developers even share this collected information with third parties, such as
Google Analytics, for the purpose of gathering usage statistics. The server logs
were only accessible to the authors of this paper. Similarly, the emails were all
collected in a single, password-protected email account of one of the authors.
We did not attempt to extract any information from these emails, nor trace
their senders. Gee and Kim performed a similar experiment in 2011, capturing
emails through typosquatting domains and released statistics to the research
community, as a demonstration of the dangers of typosquatting [12].
